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Abstract
An analyst who works in Germany is more likely to publish a high (low)
price target regarding a DAX30 stock if other Germany based analysts are
also optimistic (pessimistic) about the same stock. This ﬁnding is not biased
by the fact that DAX30 companies are headquartered in Germany. In times of
bull markets, price targets of analysts who regularly exchange their opinion
are higher correlated compared to other analysts. This eﬀect vanishes in
a bearish market environment. This suggests that communication among
analysts indeed plays an important role. However, analysts’ incentives induce
them not to deviate too much from the overall average during an economic
downturn.
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On June 30th 2011 there have been roughly 42.000 actively traded stocks
word wide.1 Although ﬁnancial markets are rather eﬃcient regarding the
availability of information nowadays, this quantity of investment opportuni-
ties makes it impossible for market participants to access and elaborate every
piece of information. In this context, ﬁnancial market analysts play a central
role. They focus each on a few investment opportunities and use their sector
expertise and tracking experience to provide forecasts of ﬁnancial ﬁgures and
thereof derive investment recommendations. The resulting impact analysts
have on investment behaviour and market outcomes has led to a stream of
literature that is concerned with how analysts derive their forecasts and rec-
ommendations and to what extend they are inﬂuenced by other analysts.
Empirical works of Hong et al. (2000); Krishnan et al. (2006) show that equity
sell-side analysts2 herd while providing earnings forecasts. Zitzewitz (2001);
Bernhardt et al. (2006); Naujoks et al. (2009) ﬁnd an anti-herding behaviour
in the same context. Kim and Zapatero (2009); Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)
among others use analysts’ investment recommendation to provide empirical
evidence for herding behaviour. The afore cited authors have in common,
that they all assume that an individual analyst is homogeneously inﬂuenced
by all other analysts.
Only few authors have assumed heterogeneous inﬂuence among analysts so
far. Graham (1999) ﬁnds that analysts are more strongly inﬂuenced by a
lead analyst who is deﬁned by his reputation. Cooper et al. (2001) consider
several lead analysts who are determined by past performance and market
recognition. Welch (2000) postulates that an analyst’s investment recom-
mendation is inﬂuenced by the consensus recommendation and the two most
recently published recommendations of other analysts.
With this paper, I set up on the assumption of heterogeneous inﬂuence. I
contribute to the afore cited literature by providing a detailed analysis of the
1This number has been published by the World Federation of Exchanges members on
www.world-exchanges.org and refers to the stocks that are traded on the 54 major stock
exchanges in the world. Double counting has tried to be eliminated by only considering
domestic stocks from the perspective of each stock exchange
2Hereafter, the term analyst always refers to an equity analyst. Due to empirical
data availability, it is furthermore always referred to a sell-side analyst. See for instance
Groysberg et al. (2007) for a detailed comparative analysis between buy-side and sell-side
analysts.
2geographical structure of inﬂuence and relating it to the prevailing market en-
vironment. My ﬁrst hypothesis is that analysts are more strongly inﬂuenced
by analysts that are geographically proximate. The theoretical foundation
for this hypothesis is derived from the latest evidence in the psychological
literature. Reis et al. (2011) found that individuals are more strongly at-
tracted by individuals with whom they are more familiar. Translating this
into the ﬁnancial context, this means that forecasts and recommendations of
analysts working in the same country could appear more reliable, as these
analysts might be perceived to be more familiar due to the same language
or a similar background. Analysts who work in the same city have a higher
probability to know each other personally, which might amplify this eﬀect.
The hypothesis of familiarity is also motivated by the evidence that has al-
ready been provided in the context of portfolio selection (see e.g. Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001); Huberman (2001)).
In the analyst literature, authors so far have always postulated that inﬂuence
among analysts only takes place via observation. It has mainly been argued
that this is due to the fact that analysts work for diﬀerent ﬁrms and thus are
competitors. However, there are various theoretical settings that show that
communication among competing participants on ﬁnancial markets can be
beneﬁcial (Eren and Ozsoylev, 2006; Stein, 2008; Gray, 2010). The reason
for this lies in the fact that through the exchange of opinion, also known
as word-of-mouth3, information and potential research advantage is not only
given away. An analyst can also collect new pieces of information and learns
about other analysts’ views which helps to validate the own results.4 Based
on these theoretical considerations, my second hypothesis is that analysts are
more strongly inﬂuenced by analysts with whom they exchange their opinion.
This hypothesis is related to the ﬁrst one, because the likelihood that two
analysts know each other and exchange their opinion is higher, if they are
geographically proximate. Evidence in favour of this hypothesis has already
been provided in the context of institutional investors (see e.g. Shiller and
Pound (1989); Hong et al. (2005)) as well as retail investors (see e.g. Ivkovic
3I use the term ”exchange of opinion” in order to emphasise, that information is not
only transmitted, but also discussed.
4One could also think of the situation where information is only given away, however,
with the intention to inﬂuence other analysts such that they skew their valuation results
into a desired direction, which makes the own already published result more credible for
investors.
3and Weisbenner (2007)).
With my third hypothesis, I state that eﬀects of geographical proximity or
the exchange of opinion are more strongly pronounced during an economic
upturn compared to an economic downturn. I base this hypothesis on the
incentive structure of analysts who are judged by their relative performance
(Hong et al., 2000; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Chen and Jiang, 2006). This
means, in times of a bull market they try to stand up from the crowd in
order to distinguish themselves from competitors (Zwiebel, 1995). However,
during an economic downturn which generally induces a high uncertainty,
they try not to deviate too much from the overall average in order to limit
the potential loss (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Clarke and Subramanian,
2006).
My database consists of price targets regarding the stocks of DAX30 compa-
nies that have been published by sell-side analysts in the period from 2005 to
mid 2010. A price target refers to the value of a stock an analyst considers to
be fair and therefore expects to be reached by the market price within a pre-
deﬁned horizon that usually equals one year. Hence, price targets represent
investment recommendations and thus might have a direct impact on mar-
ket participants. In an empirical setting, the advantage of the price target
compared to the verbal investment recommendation (buy, hold, sell) lies in
the fact that it is a continuous variable that quantiﬁes how optimistic or pes-
simistic an analyst is about a stock. The motivation for the choice of DAX30
stocks lies in the fact that they have high analyst coverage. Moreover, it al-
lows the analysis of a homogenous group of international analysts who have
an indirect impact on one of the major European indices. Such a focus has
not been considered in the analyst literature so far. The database is unique
to the extent, that it represents a merger of the commonly used commercial
database I/B/E/S provided by Thomson Reuters and the data of analyst re-
ports that are publicly available on the webpage www.aktiencheck.de. While
I/B/E/S is rather focussed on analyst reports of great brokerage houses and
investment banks, the reports on www.aktiencheck.de include investment
newsletters of research houses and daily newspapers that also have inﬂuence
on market participants. The period of the database allows a very up-to-date
analysis of analysts’ behaviour before and during the recent ﬁnancial and eco-
nomic crisis that has also not been conducted in the analyst literature yet. In
order to examine the inﬂuence that results from the exchange of opinion, one
has to know which analysts actually exchange their opinion with each other.
In the context of institutional investors, Hong et al. (2005) assume that the
4exchange of opinion only or at least primarily takes place on the city level.
In the context of retail investors, Massa and Simonov (2005) state that there
are more characteristics that indicate the exchange of opinion, namely the
profession and the former university attendance. In order to not having to
rely on any assumption, I conducted a representative survey among DAX30
analysts with the intention to ﬁnd out with whom a particular analyst ex-
changes his opinion.
Within the empirical analysis, I ﬁnd that a German analyst increases his
price target by 0.32 EUR (0.15%), if other German analysts increase their
price target by 1 EUR (1%) while analysts working outside Germany keep
their price targets constant. This corroborates the hypothesis of geographical
proximity for German analysts. I show that this result is not related to the
fact that DAX30 companies are headquartered in Germany, which one might
think to be an informational advantage. Regarding the exchange of opinion,
I discover a high correlation of price targets that are published before the
economic crisis by analysts who exchange their opinion. Hence, my second
hypothesis is aﬃrmed at least for the period before the economic crisis. It is
not approved for the period during the economic crisis which in turn however
is consistent with my third hypothesis that analysts strongly align their price
targets with the consensus in times of great uncertainty which is generally
given during a crisis.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In chapter 2, I present
the dataset as well as the survey results and outline how this data is used
for the empirical analysis. The results are provided in chapter 3. Chapter 4
concludes.
2. Data & Methology
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on the price targets regard-
ing the stocks of the thirty German companies that were included in the
index DAX30 as of May 31st 2010. In order to avoid confusions in the fol-
lowing, the term company shall always refer to organisation having emitted
a stock, whereas ﬁrm denotes the organisation an analyst is employed by.
The period of analysis comprises the almost ﬁve and a half year time win-
dow from 1 January st 2005 to May 31st 2010 and thus includes the stock
market peak preceding the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007/08 as well as the crisis
itself. The price targets are primarily extracted from I/B/E/S, the common
database of analysts’ estimates provided by Thomson Reuters. This yielded
510,972 values for the period of analysis. Further price targets were collected
from analyst reports being published on www.aktiencheck.de5. For the same
period of time 27,175 reports have been evaluated and 16,821 price targets
extracted. Both databases have then been merged as follows. The I/B/E/S
database has been used as a basis. Price targets from analysts employed by
ﬁrms that are not included in I/B/E/S have directly been added. For those
ﬁrms that appeared in both databases, the publication dates regarding to
a speciﬁc company have been compared. In the case they were equal, only
the I/B/E/S data has been taken.6 Otherwise, the price target from the
analyst report on www.aktiencheck.de has been added. In order to avoid
double entries due to diﬀering publication dates, a time window of plus mi-
nus ﬁve days has been applied. Thereby, a buﬀer of ten days was generated
cancelling out unreal price target updates. Moreover, ﬁrms’ names instead of
analysts’ names have been used for this comparison in order to avoid double
entries that result from the fact that two analysts of a research team who
published one common price target appear with one analyst’s name in the
ﬁrst database and with the other analyst’s name in the second. Note, that
data of I/B/E/S is adjusted by stock splits. As the analyst reports published
on www.aktiencheck.de represent the original reports as being published at
the time, the extracted price targets also had to be adjusted by stock splits
to be consistent with the I/B/E/S data. The merger of both databases
yielded 25,534 price targets. Dropping all ﬁrms that published less than
30 price targets during the whole period of analysis reduced the number of
ﬁrms by one half and lead to a database of 24,893 price targets. The ﬁnal
database resulted by eliminating all entries where only the ﬁrm but not the
corresponding analyst was known and consists of 17,898 price targets. This
database is unique regarding to the following fact: While I/B/E/S primarily
contains estimates of investment banks, reports on www.aktiencheck.de also
comprise estimates from independent research ﬁrms and investment letters.
The merger of both databases hence represents a broader spectrum of ana-
lysts’ price targets. Table 1 gives an overview of ﬁrms included in the new
database. Moreover, the original database and the corresponding number of
5aktiencheck.de AG is an independent research ﬁrm that collects analysts reports and
publishes them together with own reports on its webpage.
6Ljungqvist et al. (2009) reported systematic errors in the historical I/B/E/S recom-
mendation database. The comparison of price targets that appear in both databases,
however, did not reveal remarkable deviations.
6price target publications are indicated.
In order to analyse the geographic structure of inﬂuence, an analysts’ work-
ing location has to be known. Although the city is indicated on the analyst
reports on www.aktiencheck.de, the data could not be used as it usually only
referred to the headquarter of the particular ﬁrm and not to the actual place
of work of an analyst. Hence, for each analyst in the database the city and
the corresponding country have been searched by hand on the internet. Ta-
ble 2 shows the distribution of analysts by ﬁrm, country and city as well as
the corresponding number of published price targets. Hereafter, an analyst’s
nationality is used interchangeably with the country where he works. This
means for instance that a ”German” analyst refers to an analyst who works in
Germany although there might be German analysts who work abroad. Most
of the ﬁrms are Germany based, however, closely followed by UK. London is
the city, where most of the analysts work and is followed by Frankfurt, where
less than a half of London based analysts work. German analysts published
about 70% of all price targets. The portion of UK based analysts who all
work in London equals approximately 20%. Analysts working in Frankfurt
published about one third of all price targets.
In order to determine the inﬂuence that results from the exchange of opin-
ion among analysts, a survey of DAX30 analysts in has been conducted. In
the period from June 15th to July 8th 2010, all analysts in the price target
database have been contacted by email and asked to ﬁll in a questionnaire.
Out of 1,184 analysts in the database 718 could be reached7 and 195 replied.
This corresponds to a response rate of 27.2%, which ensures the represen-
tativeness of the survey. The questionnaire consisting of eleven questions is
shown in table 3. Concerning analysts’ interaction and reciprocal inﬂuence
from the exchange of opinions, the most important questions are the ques-
tions #5 and #7 asking for the number of analysts, an analyst had already
social contact with and an analyst regularly exchanges forecast results with,
respectively. The ﬁgures 1 and 3 plot the answers of these two questions.
From the data, it can be seen that social contacts are quite numerous. Only
14.0% answered not personally knowing at least one other analyst. Addi-
tional comments of the respondents conﬁrm that there is a community of
analysts covering a stock wherein the members know each other and most
7The remaining analysts could not be contacted, as they either left their ﬁrm or because
no or not a valid email address could be found.
7Table 1:
Table 1: Overview of the ﬁrms included in the new price target
database
Firm I/B/E/S aktiencheck
ABN AMRO - 7
AC Research - 38
Actien-B¨ orse - 82
Ahorro Corporaci´ on Financiera S.V., S.A. 17 -
Banc of America Securities-Merrill Lynch Research 3 302
Banco Sabadell 42 -
Bankhaus Lampe 104 198
Bankhaus Metzler 335 -
Barclays Capital 34 3
Bear Stearns 15 2
Berenberg Bank 46 -
BHF-BANK 359 28
Cheuvreux 595 222
Citigroup - 625
Collins Stewart 32 2
Commerzbank Corporates & Markets 268 196
Credit Suisse 219 169
Daiwa Securities SMBC Europe Limited 26 -
Der Aktion¨ ar - 189
Der Aktion¨ arsbrief - 58
Deutsche Bank 269 139
Dexia Securities 5 37
DZ BANK 236 -
equinet AG 163 238
EURO am Sonntag - 172
Evolution Securities 31 -
Exane BNP Paribas - 84
FOCUS-MONEY - 59
Fox Pitt & Kelton 14 -
Frankfurter B¨ orsenbrief - 84
Fuchsbriefe - 37
Goldman Sachs - 281
Helvea 43 20
HSBC - 106
HypoVereinsbank - 802
IIR Group 16 16
Independent Research - 1507
ING 1 78
J.P. Morgan Securities - 324
Jeﬀeries & Co 52 7
Jyske Bank 44 22
Keefe Bruyette & Woods 36 9
Kepler Capital Markets 201 64
Landesbank Baden-W¨ urttemberg 257 30
Lehman Brothers 53 25
LRP Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz 217 898
M.M. Warburg & CO 448 143
Macquarie 59 4
Merck Finck & Co. - 156
Morgan Stanley - 206
National-Bank AG - 159
Natixis Securities 143 -
Nomura Equity Research 171 19
Nord LB 112 583
Oddo Securities 117 -
Piper Jaﬀray 32 7
Prior B¨ orse - 48
Raymond James 39 14
Sal. Oppenheim 665 108
Sanford C. Bernstein & Co 157 34
Santander 37 -
SEB - 1171
SES Research 10 83
Soci´ et´ e G´ en´ erale 235 374
SRH AlsterResearch 20 21
Stockstreet.de - 30
UBS - 261
UniCredit Markets & Investment Banking 374 516
WestLB 280 169
6,632 11,266
17,898
The table displays the ﬁrms’ names and the number of published price targets originating
from the two diﬀerent sources.
8Table 2:
Table 2: Distribution of ﬁrms, analysts and price targets by
country and city
country city number of ﬁrms number of analysts number of targets
Belgium Brussels 2 5 61
China Hong Kong 1 1 1
Denmark Silkeborg 1 5 66
Germany Berlin 1 1 37
Detmold 1 1 84
D¨ usseldorf 6 34 815
Essen 1 5 159
Frankfurt 16 153 6.174
Hamburg 4 25 739
Hanover 1 17 695
Cologne 2 4 303
Kulmbach 1 1 189
Mainz 2 12 1.152
Munich 5 32 1.989
Stuttgart 1 24 250
Westerburg 1 3 38
France Paris 13 80 882
India Bangalore 1 1 3
Bombay 1 12 32
the Netherlands Amsterdam 3 5 44
Austria Vienna 1 1 9
Sweden Stockholm 1 1 1
Switzerland Geneva 1 2 27
Zurich 5 11 120
Spain Madrid 4 18 94
South Korea Seoul 1 1 22
UK London 33 388 3.781
USA New York 5 13 120
San Francisco 2 2 11
117 858 17.898
The table displays the number of diﬀerent ﬁrms, analysts and price targets on the country
and the city level. Please not that ﬁrms that are based at diﬀerent locations are double
counted. The same applies for analysts who changed their working location during the
period of analysis.
Table 3:
Table 3: Questionnaire of the survey
#1 How long have you been working at your ﬁrm?
#2 In which city do you work?
#3 Where have you been employed before?
#4 Which university did you attend?
#5 With about how many analysts, that cover at least one of the DAX30
companies covered by you, did you already have personal contact?
#6 In which way do you most likely have contact with other analysts
(e.g. telephone, meetings, events, lunch dates)?
#7 With how many analysts of question #5 do you exchange your
opinion regarding forecasts?
#8 How many analysts of question #7 work in the same country as you?
#9 How many analysts of question #7 work in the same city as you?
#10 How many analysts of question #7 work in the same ﬁrm as you?
#11 How many analysts of question #7 attended the same university as you?
9Figure 1:
Figure 1: Histogram of the answers to survey question #5
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With about how many analysts, that cover at least one of the DAX30 companies covered
by you, did you already have personal contact?
often already had a personal contact. Question #6 asking for the most
regular way of contact with other analysts provides the answer to this phe-
nomenon. Analysts meet frequently on events like investors’ days or analysts
conferences and hence communicate with each other often. The results of
question #6 are shown in ﬁgure 2. Despite this regularly contact, forecast
results are not the main topic of conversation. Following question #7, only
34.6%8 of the analysts exchange their opinions regarding forecasts with at
least one other analyst. Note, that this question is very delicate. Analysts
in this context deﬁned as sell-side analysts9 are competitors. Hence, no one
8The results of the question #7 to #9 and #11 are adjusted by the number of intra-
ﬁrm exchanges as being asked by question #10. This is done for two reasons. Analysts in
the same ﬁrm act as one unity and only publish one result. Furthermore, the exchange of
opinion in a research team takes place by deﬁnition and does not provide any insight.
9Some respondents annotated that from the formulation of the questions it is not
perceptible whether the word analyst refers to sell-side or buy-side analysts. Buy-side
analysts are sell-side analysts’ clients. Hence, the discussion of forecast results between
these two types of analysts is natural and not worth of analysis. The fact that 95% of
10Figure 2:
Figure 2: Histogram of the answers to survey question #6
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In which way do you most likely have contact with other analysts (e.g. telephone, meetings,
events, lunch dates)?
11Figure 3:
Figure 3: Histogram of the answers to survey question #7
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With how many analysts of question #5 do you exchange your opinion regarding fore-
casts?
is interested in giving away his research advantage or to reveal his ﬁndings.
Formally, ﬁrms’ policy even obliges analysts not to do so. However, the fact
that more than a third admitted to exchange their results shows, that there
is an informal component that weights stronger than policies or than obvious
principles. As stated in the introduction, such behaviour can be beneﬁcial,
because an analyst who exchanges his opinion does not only loose a research
advantage. Rather, he learns about other analysts’ views which helps him to
validate the own results. This is especially relevant for the determination of
price targets, where also assumptions and valuation methods can be discussed
without loosing a speciﬁc research advantage regarding an earnings forecast
for instance. Indeed, some respondents that denied the exchange of forecast
results, as question #7 was formulated, annotated that they nonetheless ex-
change assumptions and details about valuation techniques. This suggests
the answers to question #7 are below or equal ﬁve proves that the questions have been
understood as being indented, if one assumes that number of sell-side analysts’ clients is
usually greater than ﬁve. As a precaution, the two answers above 15 have been taken oﬀ.
12the actual number of analysts’ reciprocal inﬂuence from the exchange of opin-
ions to be higher. Another fact that supports this tendency is that through
the delicate nature of the question maybe not all answers reﬂect the actual
situation.
The basic intention of the survey was to determine with whom an analyst
exchanges his opinion. In order to get an acceptable feed-back ratio, no an-
alyst has been asked for the names of analysts with whom he exchanges his
opinion. Instead, it is intended to reduce the universe of analysts that might
be potential counterparts for the exchange of opinion. This is done by asking
for the working location in questions #8 and #9. In the average 82% of the
analysts that exchange forecast results work in the same country (median:
100%). This result is not biased by the fact that all analysts work in the
same country as only 56% of the respondents work in the country where most
of the respondents work (Germany). Regarding the city level, in the average
only 44% of the analysts that exchange forecast results work in the same city
(median: 50%). This number is consistent with the answers of question #6,
where only 10% of the respondents answered to use lunch dates as a regular
way of having contact with other analysts. However, in the two cities where
with 26% and 22% most of the respondents work (Frankfurt and London),
this number lies at 65% and 78% respectively.
With Question #11 asking for the former university attendance, it was in-
tended to get another criterion to determine the analysts who exchange their
opinion. I considered this characteristic, because it is used in other empir-
ical studies in the context of the exchange of opinion (see e.g. Massa and
Simonov (2005); Cohen et al. (2009)). However, it turned out not to be
adequate, because in the average only 1% of the respondents that exchange
forecast results attended the same university (median: 0%).
Within the empirical analysis of this paper, I do not determine the ab-
solute magnitude of inﬂuence or whether analysts inﬂuence each other at
all. This has already done in several prior studies (see e.g. Graham (1999);
Hong et al. (2000); Welch (2000); Cooper et al. (2001); Zitzewitz (2001);
Bernhardt et al. (2006); Krishnan et al. (2006); Kim and Zapatero (2009);
Naujoks et al. (2009); Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)). Instead, I aim to analyse
the structure of inﬂuence. Therefore, I divide the analysts of the database
into groups. The composition of these groups varies with the hypotheses to
be contrasted. In order to test the ﬁrst hypothesis, for instance, one group
consists of all analysts who work in the same country while the other group
13is composed of analysts who work in diﬀerent countries. The resulting basic
regression is given by
Pict = αP
(g1)
ct + βP
(g2)
ct , (1)
where Pict denotes the price target that is published by analyst i regarding
stock c at time t. As not all analysts publish their price target on the same
day, t has to be understood as a time window. P
(g1)
ct represents the mean
value of price targets that belong to a speciﬁc group of analysts from the
perspective of analyst i. For instance, if analyst i works in Germany then
the ﬁrst group could consist of other Germany based analysts whereas the
second group refers to analysts who work outside Germany. In case the
inﬂuence among analysts was homogeneous, then the coeﬃcients α and β
should not diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
In order to determine the relevance of the exchange of opinion and thereby to
contrast the second hypothesis, the ﬁrst group has to be formed by analysts
who exchange their opinion with analyst i, while the second group has to
contain only analysts who don’t. As stated above, I do not certainly know
which analyst has to be assigned to which group, however, I can use the
working locations to get a good guess. If for instance, there are four analysts
who all cover Siemens and work for diﬀerent ﬁrms in D¨ usseldorf and one
of these analysts answered to exchange his opinion with two analysts who
cover the same company and work in the same city, then taking randomly
two out of three analysts in this city yields a probability of 100% to place
at least one analyst correctly and a probability of 33% to assign all analysts
to the correct groups. The latter probability also increases to 100%, if one
of these three analysts answered not to exchange his opinion with any other
analyst. However, it is not even necessary to place all analysts correctly.
Under the null hypothesis h0, a counterpart for the exchange of opinion has
a higher inﬂuence compared to other analysts. Looking at the survey data
and comparing the ﬁrst and the second three columns in table 4 one observes,
that the number of analysts with whom the opinion is exchanged (group g1)
is generally smaller than the number of other analysts (group g2). As I
always consider group averages, the inﬂuence of a singular analyst in group
g2 is therefore very small. This means that if a counterpart for the exchange
of opinion is wrongly placed in group g2, the coeﬃcients α and β still might
be estimated correctly, if there are enough analysts that are correctly placed
in group g1. In most of the cases, it is even suﬃcient that group g1 only
contains one properly assigned analyst. Regarding the estimation of the
14Table 4:
Table 4: Overview of the analysts who regularly exchange their
opinion with other analysts
country city same city same country other countries exchange exchange country level exchange
ex same city city level ex city level other countries
Germany D¨ usseldorf 3.5 36.5 42.0 2.0 0.0 2.8
Frankfurt 14.7 14.3 50.0 2.3 0.8 3.7
Hamburg 0.3 34.0 39.0 0.0 2.5 0.3
Mainz 0.0 23.0 37.0 0.0 7.0 1.0
Munich 1.3 29.3 33.3 0.3 1.3 0.6
Stuttgart 0.0 26.5 32.0 0.0 2.2 0.3
France Paris 3.0 0.0 44.7 0.7 0.0 1.3
Switzerland Zurich 3.0 0.0 37.0 2.0 0.0 3.0
UK London 14.0 0.0 43.7 1.3 0.0 1.7
The ﬁrst three columns of the table provide the average number of analysts that are
theoretically available for the exchange of opinion because they cover the same company at
the same time. The second three columns show the average numbers of actual counterparts
for the exchange of opinions. From the perspective of the analysts working in a particular
city, the number of analysts in the same city, in the remaining country and in other
countries are indicated.
overall regression, the coeﬃcients α and β can be correctly estimated, if
from the perspective of at least half10 of the analysts, the proper estimation
of the coeﬃcients is possible. In the appendix, I derive how to calculate the
probability for estimating the correct coeﬃcients of equation 1, if the analysts
are randomly assigned to the groups and the restriction obtained by the
survey are taken into account. The resulting value amounts to 73.28%. This
means that running 100 simulations for the group assignment, the coeﬃcients
of equation 1 can be estimated correctly in 73 cases.
3. Results
With this paper, I intend to shed light on the structure of the inﬂuence
among analysts. In this context, I test the relevance of geographical proxim-
ity, the impact of the exchange of opinion and the temporal change induced
by the economic crisis starting in 2008. I begin with the analysis on the coun-
try level (see table 5). From the perspective of a particular analyst, all other
analysts covering the same company are divided into those who work in the
same country (group g1) and those who work in a diﬀerent country (group
10In the following, I weight the number of analysts with the amount of price targets
published by them.
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Table 5: Regression results for the structure of inﬂuence on the
country level
α β const α − β N R2
(I) all analysts 0.5600*** 0.4148*** 1.0081*** 0.1452*** 12,186 0.8734
(0.0124) (0.0123) (0.2117) (0.0213)
(II) only non German analysts 0.3130*** 0.6868*** 0.8089*** -0.3738*** 3,946 0.9130
(0.0194) (0.0203) (0.3134) (0.0343)
(III) only German analysts 0.6453*** 0.3250*** 1.0027*** 0.3203*** 8,240 0.8556
(0.0160) (0.0155) (0.2729) (0.0271)
(IV) without three German ﬁrms 0.5853*** 0.3777*** 1.2923*** 0.2077*** 6,446 0.8306
with most of the price targets (0.0191) (0.0184) (0.3342) (0.0322)
(V) time window of 45 days 0.6658*** 0.3040*** 0.9453*** 0.3617*** 8,673 0.8616
(0.0165) (0.0160) (0.2591) (0.0280)
(VI) time window of 15 days 0.6189*** 0.3554*** 0.9324*** 0.2635*** 7,192 0.8404
(0.0164) (0.0159) (0.3088) (0.0277)
(VII) normalised price targets 0.4361*** 0.2846*** 0.3230*** 0.1515*** 8,240 0.1421
(0.0175) (0.0208) (0.0251) (0.0299)
(VIII) inﬂuence of German analysts 0.5096*** 0.4754*** 1.3713*** 0.0343 3,991 0.9131
on foreign analysts (0.0170) (0.0166) (0.3008) (0.0289)
The table provides the results of the basic regression 1 on the country level. From the
perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains domestic analysts, while group g2
is build of foreign analysts. This composition of the groups changes in speciﬁcation VIII,
where group g1 contains German analysts and group g2 is constructed by all other ana-
lysts. Speciﬁcation I includes all analysts. Speciﬁcation II and VIII only include analysts
who work outside Germany. Speciﬁcation III-VII only include Germany based analysts.
A detailed description of the speciﬁcations is provided in the text. The signiﬁcance of co-
eﬃcients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Standard deviations
are provided in parentheses.
16g2). As time window, I consider the thirty days period before the publication
of the price target of a particular analyst. This time window is so designed
that an analyst can only be inﬂuenced by analysts whose price targets were
observable prior his own publication. The length of thirty days guarantees
that there are enough analysts to be included with their price targets, while
the latter however are not too old. Estimating the coeﬃcients of equation
yields a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of 0.1452 (speciﬁcation I). This result, however,
might be biased by the fact that most of the price targets are published by
Germany based analysts. Indeed, considering only analysts working outside
Germany on the left hand side of equation 1 leads to a negative diﬀerence
of -0.3738 (speciﬁcation II). This implies that the diﬀerence for German an-
alysts is actually higher than estimated by the ﬁrst regression. Indeed, this
diﬀerence equals 0.3203 (speciﬁcation III). This means, that a German ana-
lyst increases his price target by 0.32 EUR if other German analysts increase
their price target by 1 EUR while analysts working outside Germany keep
their price targets constant. In order to provide some robustness checks for
this result, several out-of sample regressions have been run. First, the three
German ﬁrms that provided most of the price targets are excluded. This
still leads to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of 0.2077 (speciﬁcation IV). Next, the
time window has been varied. Considering a time window of 45 as well as 15
days prior the publication of a particular analyst’s price target yields signif-
icant diﬀerences of 0.3617 and 0.2635, respectively (speciﬁcation V and VI).
Finally, I aim to suppress the bias of potential heteroscedasticity. There-
fore, I normalised price targets by the market price of the corresponding
stock on the day prior the publication. The resulting diﬀerence is signiﬁcant
and equals 0.1515 (speciﬁcation VII). This means, that a German analyst
increases his price target by 0.15%, if other German analysts increase their
price target by 1% while analysts working outside Germany keep their price
targets constant.
After having provided empirical evidence that the intra-country correlation
of price targets only applies for Germany based analysts, one might assume
that this correlation is not due to the common country but is due to the
fact that the companies of the examined stocks are also headquartered in
Germany. Due to this fact, German analysts might have or might at least
be assumed to have a better set of information such that foreign analysts
are more strongly inﬂuenced by German analysts than by their domestic
colleagues. In order to analyse the inﬂuence that is generated by German
analysts from the perspective of an analyst working outside Germany, I built
17up a group of analysts that work in Germany (group g1) and a group of all
other analysts (group g2). The diﬀerence between the estimated coeﬃcients
equals 0.0343 and turns out to be insigniﬁcant (speciﬁcation VIII). Hence,
an analyst who works outside Germany is not more strongly inﬂuenced by
German analysts than by all other analysts. Nevertheless, a German analyst
still might have a better set of information although this is not recognised by
analysts working outside Germany. I contrast this alternative hypothesis by
comparing the returns an investor would have realised, if he had followed the
implicit investment recommendations provided by price targets. The returns
are given by
rict =

Pc,t+365 + dct,t+365
Pct
− 1

sgn(Pict − Pct), (2)
where Pct is the market price of stock c at time t and Pc,t+365 is the stock
price one year there after. The dividends that are paid during the period are
given by dct,t+365. If an analyst publishes a price target that is higher than
the current market price, then he considers the stock to be under valuated
and implicitly recommends buying the stock. However, an analyst would
not necessarily recommend buying a stock when his price target is only little
higher than the prevailing stock price. Therefore, I use several thresholds for
my analysis. These are 1%, 3% and 5%. By including dividends in equation
2, rict represents a gross return. For the comparative analysis of German
and non German analysts I consider gross as well as net returns, i.e. returns
that are calculated by including and excluding dividend payments. The re-
sults are displayed in table 6. It can be seen that returns that result from
recommendations of German analysts are slightly higher. However, none of
the diﬀerences are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Therefore, I can con-
clude that analysts working in Germany do not have better knowledge about
DAX30 companies although they are also headquartered in Germany. This
ﬁnding is in line with Bae et al. (2008), who show that local information ad-
vantage vanishes for large companies that operate globally and have a good
disclosure policy.
Now turning to the city level, from the perspective of a particular analyst, all
other analysts covering the same company are divided into those who work
in the same city (group g1) and those who work in a diﬀerent city (group g2).
The resulting diﬀerence equals -0.3330 (speciﬁcation IX). Hence, analysts are
more strongly inﬂuenced by analysts who work in diﬀerent cities compared
to those who work in the same city. This result remains unchanged if only
18Table 6:
Table 6: Average performance of German and non German
analysts
Germany not Germany diﬀerence
gross return, threshold 1% 6,98% 6,11% 0,87%
(53,65%) (51,75%)
net return, threshold 1% 5,46% 4,43% 1,03%
(53,79%) (51,78%)
gross return, threshold 3% 7,18% 6,36% 0,81%
(54,28%) (52,39%)
net return, threshold 3% 5,62% 4,66% 0,97%
(54,38%) (52,38%)
gross return, threshold 5% 7,46% 6,62% 0,84%
(54,33%) (53,06%)
net return, threshold 5% 5,81% 4,89% 0,93%
(54,35%) (53,07%)
The table shows average hypothetical returns that result from German and non German
analysts’ implicit recommendation provided by their price targets. The diﬀerent methods
of calculation are explained in the text. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
analysts working outside Germany or only German analysts are considered
on the right hand side of equation 1 (speciﬁcation X and XI). All regression
results based on the city level are shown in table 7.
Up to now, only the inﬂuence from observation has been considered. In
the following, I like to determine the relevance of the exchange of opinion
among analysts. Therefore, I consider a time window of ±30 days, because
it is not necessary that an analyst observes another analyst’s price target. In
chapter 2, I explained that I do not certainly know an analyst’s counterparts
for the exchange of opinion. However, the data of the survey can be used
to get a good guess, if the analysts are randomly assigned to the group of
analysts who exchange their opinion with analyst i (group g1) and the group
of those who don’t (group g2). Under the null hypothesis h0 that an analyst
is more strongly inﬂuenced by those analysts with whom he exchanges his
opinion, the probability for correctly estimating the coeﬃcients in equation
1 equals 73.28%. This value results, if the probability on the level of a single
analyst is weighted by all price targets he has published during the period
of analysis (see equation A.3). However, an analysts might publish a price
target in a period of time when no other analyst of those who are randomly
19Table 7:
Table 7: Regression results for the structure of inﬂuence on the
city level
α β const α − β N R2
(IX) all analysts 0.3245*** 0.6576*** 0.7394*** -0.3330*** 10,329 0.8741
(0.0147) (0.0150) (0.2332) (0.0256)
(X) only non German analysts 0.3155*** 0.6839*** 0.8180*** -0.3685*** 3,918 0.9123
(0.0195) (0.0203) (0.3145) (0.0343)
(XI) only German analysts 0.3012*** 0.6702*** 0.6959** -0.3691*** 6,411 0.8510
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.3228) (0.0365)
The table provides the results of the basic regression 1 on the city level. From the per-
spective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts who work in the same city,
while group g2 is build of analysts who work in diﬀerent cities. Speciﬁcation (IX) in-
cludes all analysts. Speciﬁcation (X) only includes analysts who work outside Germany.
Speciﬁcation (XI) only includes Germany based analysts. The signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients
is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Standard deviations are
provided in parentheses.
assigned to group g1 published a price target. In this case, the observation
has to be dropped for the regression 1. Hence, the weighting depends on the
random composition of group g1 and g2, such that the probability for cor-
rectly estimating the coeﬃcients varies slightly. Table 8 provides the results
of 1000 simulations. It can be seen that the mean probability for a proper
assignment equals 75.3%. The average diﬀerence α − β is negative and the
point estimate of this diﬀerence is positive in only 43.0% of the cases. Given
the fact that under h0 one would expect α−β to be signiﬁcantly greater than
zero in 75.3% of the cases, h0 has to be rejected. Thus, I have to conclude
that the exchange of opinion has no or at least less relevance than observa-
tion.
All afore presented results are obtained by using the whole database ranging
from the beginning of 2005 to mid 2010. This is a time period where lots of
changes took place on ﬁnancial markets. There was a bull market until the
beginning of 2007 when the U.S. subprime crisis began to develop to a global
ﬁnancial crisis. The consequences for non ﬁnancial companies arose with the
delay of one year, when the ﬁnancial crisis became an economic crisis. Most
of the companies in the DAX30 are non ﬁnancial companies, such that it is
of interest to examine changes in analysts’ behaviour before and during the
economic crisis. The beginning is marked by the collapse of the investment
bank Lehman brothers on September 15th 2008. This date is quite exactly
in the middle of the analysed period and thus allows separating the whole
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Table 8: Regression results for the relevance of the exchange of
opinion
α β const α − β N
0.8265 0.4496 0.5465 -0.0969 679
(1.6738) (0.3687) (0.3570) (0.7250)
P
PC
i=1 wiIi > r

P (α − β > 0) P (α − β > 0 ∧ p < 0.05)
75.3% 43.0% 27.3%
The table provides the mean results of the simulation with 1000 estimates of the basic
regression 1 that is used to determine the relevance of the exchange of opinion. From the
perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts with whom he exchanges
his opinion, while group g2 is build of other analysts. P
PC
i=1 wiIi > r

is the average
probability that for a random assignment of the groups the coeﬃcients can be correctly
estimated under the null hypothesis. P (α − β > 0) is the portion of simulation runs,
where the diﬀerence α − β turned out to be positive. P (α − β > 0 ∧ p < 0.05) is the
portion of simulation runs, where the diﬀerence α−β resulted to be signiﬁcantly positive.
Standard deviations of the point estimates resulting from the simulation runs are provided
in parentheses.
database into two sets of data with similar number of observations. In the
following, I use these two temporal subsets in order to repeat the analyses
on the country and city level as well as regarding the exchange of opinion.
The results for the country and city level are shown in table 9. On the
country level, I only consider German analysts, as prior results showed that
the relevance of the country only applies for analysts who work in Germany.
It can be seen that the diﬀerence α − β is considerably greater before the
economic crisis than during it (speciﬁcations XII and XIII). Before the crisis,
a German analyst increased his price target by 0.51 EUR, if other German
analyst increased their price target by 1 EUR and other analysts kept their
price targets constant. This is 0.34 EUR more than during the crisis. On the
city level, α − β is negative before as well as during the crisis (speciﬁcations
XIV and XV). However, this diﬀerence is slightly greater, i.e. less negative
before the crisis. Table 10 shows the temporal diﬀerences for the exchange of
opinion. During the economic crisis the mean diﬀerence α−β is negative and
only 33.9% of the simulation runs yielded a positive diﬀerence α − β. This
is in line with the previously obtained results by using the whole dataset.
However, looking at the period before the economic crisis, α − β turns out
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Table 9: Regression results for the temporal change on the
country and the city level
α β const α − β N R2
(XII) country level: German analysts 0.7414*** 0.2354*** 1.0673*** 0.5060*** 2,845 0.9372
before econmic crisis (0.0198) (0.0186) (0.3542) (0.0330)
(XIII) country level: German analysts 0.5646*** 0.4000*** 0.9497** 0.1647*** 5,328 0.7665
during econmic crisis (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.3980) (0.0389)
(XIV) city level: all analysts 0.3498*** 0.6300*** 1.0152*** -0.2802*** 4,102 0.9376
before econmic crisis (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.2965) (0.0312)
(XV) city level: all analysts 0.3189*** 0.6658*** 0.5414 -0.3469*** 6,144 0.7874
during econmic crisis (0.0217) (0.0227) (0.3553) (0.0382)
The table provides the results of the basic regression 1 on the country and the city level. In
speciﬁcation XII and XIII, only German analysts are considered. From the perspective of
a particular analyst group g1 contains domestic analysts, while group g2 is build of foreign
analysts. Speciﬁcations XIV and XV are based on all analysts. From the perspective of a
particular analyst group g1 contains analysts who work in the same city while group g2 is
build of analysts who work in diﬀerent cities. The dataset is divided into two subsets with
price targets being published before (speciﬁcations XII and XIV) and during the economic
crisis (speciﬁcations XIII and XV). The signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients is indicated by stars (*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
Table 10:
Table 10: Regression results for the temporal change of relevance
of exchange of opinion
α β const α − β N
before economic crisis 4.2817 0.5131 0.4173 0.0958 262
(1.7417) (0.1701) (0.1737) (0.3425)
after economic crisis -3.4232 0.4001 0.7015 -0.3014 415
(2.4488) (0.8471) (0.8189) (1.6647)
P
PC
i=1 wiIi > r

P (α − β > 0) P (α − β > 0 ∧ p < 0.05)
before economic crisis 63.4% 64.8% 45.2%
after economic crisis 78.7% 33.9% 23.7%
The table provides the mean results of the simulation with 1000 estimates of the basic
regression 1 that is used to determine the relevance of the exchange of opinion. From
the perspective of a particular analyst group g1 contains analysts with whom he ex-
changes his opinion, while group g2 is build of other analysts. The dataset is divided
into two subsets with price targets being published before and during the economic crisis.
P
PC
i=1 wiIi > r

is the average probability that for a random assignment of the groups
the coeﬃcients can be correctly estimated under the null hypothesis. P (α − β > 0) is
the portion of simulation runs, where the diﬀerence α − β turned out to be positive.
P (α − β > 0 ∧ p < 0.05) is the portion of simulation runs, where the diﬀerence α − β re-
sulted to be signiﬁcantly positive. Standard deviations of the point estimates resulting
from the simulation runs are provided in parentheses.
22to be positive. The corresponding probability for correctly estimating the
coeﬃcients α and β equals 63.4% under h0. The portion of simulations runs
where α is greater than β results to be 64.8%. This indicates that the in-
ﬂuence from the exchange of opinion plays a considerable for price targets
published before the economic crisis.
The afore-presented results corroborate the hypothesis of local proximity for
German analysts and the hypothesis that analysts are more strongly inﬂu-
enced by their counterparts for the exchange of opinion (at least before the
economic crisis). However, there might be an alternative explanation for
these ﬁndings. An often cited caveat in the literature of social interaction
(see e.g. Manski (1993); Brock and Durlauf (2001); Moﬃtt (2001); Blume
et al. (2010)) is that individuals only appear to be inﬂuenced by peer group
members. In truth, their actions are correlated, because peer group members
have similar background characteristics that induce them to act analogously.
In my context, this means for the ﬁrst hypothesis that price targets of German
analysts are only correlated, because all German analysts have for instance
the same education and therefore use the same method for the evaluation of
the market environment. For my second hypothesis, this would imply that
analysts exchange their opinion with only those analysts who have a similar
way of thinking about investment opportunities, such that price targets are
correlated without any actual inﬂuence taking place. There are several as-
pects that can be used to argue against these alternative explanations. First
of all, ﬁnancial education nowadays follows international standards. There
are even uniform certiﬁcates like the CFA. Therefore, it is not reasonable
to assume that German analysts use a diﬀerent tool box compared to their
colleagues working outside Germany. Moreover, the structure of inﬂuence
has been put in a temporal context. Hence, even if one does not trust the
absolute results, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of behaviour before and dur-
ing the economic crisis. This especially applies for the inﬂuence resulting
from the exchange of opinion. If one still does not want to believe in the
explanations of the structural patterns of inﬂuence, then there is at least a
clear indicator that the inﬂuence among analysts is not homogenous as it is
assumed in many empirical studies.
4. Conclusion
The results can be summarized as follows. German analysts are more sen-
sitive to the DAX30 price targets of other Germany based analysts than to
23price targets published by analysts who work in other countries. This eﬀect
is not due to the fact that DAX30 companies are also headquartered in Ger-
many. There ﬁnding are consistent with the hypothesis of local familiarity.
However, on the city level no empirical evidence in favour of this hypothesis
could be provided. Comparing the inﬂuence that results from pure observa-
tion with the inﬂuence from the exchange of opinion, I cannot ﬁnd relevance
of the latter while considering the whole period from 2005 to 2010. However,
dividing the dataset into two subsets with price targets before and during
the economic crisis starting in 2008 yields, that before the crisis price targets
of analysts who exchange their opinion systematically diﬀer from those who
don’t. This tendency also applies for the analysis on the country level. Be-
fore the economic crisis, a German analyst is considerable more responsive
to price targets of other German analysts than during the crisis.
Putting the results into perspective, one can draw the following conclusion.
Before the economic crisis, analysts indented to diﬀerentiate from their peers.
They tried to use research advantages provided by familiar analysts or those
analysts with whom they regularly exchange their opinion. During the crisis
in a time of great uncertainty, analysts were afraid of failing by providing
estimates that are too far away from other analysts’ results. Therefore, they
rather aligned their price targets with the consensus such that the geograph-
ical inﬂuence and the inﬂuence from the exchange of opinion were not or at
least less relevant.
On balance, I showed that the inﬂuence among analysts is dynamic and not
homogenous. Therefore, it is reasonable to use an adequate structure of
inﬂuence for further research of analysts’ herding behaviour.
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27Appendix A.
In this appendix, the calculation of the probability for correctly estimat-
ing the right coeﬃcients of equation 1 in the context of the exchange of
opinion among analysts shall be derived. The number of analysts that cover
the same company and thus could be potential counterparts for the exchange
of opinion from the perspective of a particular analyst shall be denoted by
N, where N is determined by the database of price targets. The group of
analysts with whom a particular analyst exchanges his opinion shall be de-
noted as g1 and contains k analysts, where k is obtained by the answers of
the survey. Group g2 consists of all other analysts who cover the same com-
pany. The number of analysts that are randomly correctly assigned to group
g1 is represented by n. The afore described constellation is visualised by
ﬁgure A.4. Under the null hypotheses h0, an analyst shall be more strongly
Figure A.4:
Figure A.4: Visualisation of the random group assignment
group g1 group g1
k N-k
n
The ﬁgure displays an example of a random group assignment. Filled circles represent
analysts that are actual counterparts for the exchange of opinion from the perspective of
a particular analyst.
inﬂuenced by analysts with whom he exchanges his opinion, i.e. by analysts
of group g1, than by all other analysts. All analysts of group g1 shall have
equal inﬂuence on a particular analyst. If h0 holds true, then from the per-
spective of a particular analyst, the following inequality has to be fulﬁlled
such that α is greater than β in equation 1:
n
k
>
k − n
N − k
⇔ n >
k2
N
(A.1)
From the perspective of a particular analyst, the k analysts of group g1 can
be separated into k1 analysts who work in the same city, k2 analysts who do
28not work in the same city but in the same country and k3 analysts who do
not work in the same country. N1, N2 and N3 stand for the corresponding
numbers of potential counterparts for the exchange of opinions. For each
analyst i, the probability that inequality A.1 is fulﬁlled is given by
Pi = P(n >
k2
N
) =
Pk
m=b k2
N c+1
Q3
j=1
 kj
mj
 Nj−kj
kj−mj

Q3
j=1
 Nj
kj
 (A.2)
s.t. k =
3 X
j=1
kj
N =
3 X
j=1
Nj
m =
3 X
j=1
mj, mj ≤ kj
The indicator Ii takes the value one, if inequality A.1 is fulﬁlled and zero
otherwise. Now, the probability that α and β can be correctly estimated
under h0 is given by
P
 
C X
i=1
wiIi > r
!
, (A.3)
where r is the percentage of correct observations in equation 1 in order to be
able to correctly estimate the coeﬃcients. For the calculation of equation A.3
in this paper, r is set equal 50%. As not every analyst published the same
number of price targets, the weighting coeﬃcient wi has been introduced. C
is the number of analysts who exchange their opinion with at least one other
analyst, i.e. k ≥ 1.
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